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Pharmacy, Law, the U.C.C.,
and Patent Medicines
John J. Kuchinski*
W ARRANTY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE appears at present
to be similar to some scientific discoveries. By the time they can
be useful they are made obsolete by newer discoveries. The doctrine of
liability without fault makes the warranty doctrine ineffective. Those
favoring such a doctrine consider warranty as something of an obstacle
since it generally requires privityI and a sale.2 Since 1950 the doctrine
of strict liability has been applied to more than only food products, 3 on
the theory that by putting a product in the market, public policy de-
mands that the manufacturer or seller stand behind his product, as a
cost of doing business.
The primary legal concern of the pharmacist has been and continues
to be in the field of negligence. With the increasing legal awareness of
society, however, it becomes imperative to examine what liabilities may
arise under the U.C.C. The main objective of this paper is to explore the
possible areas of liability that may arise under the Code in the sale of
patent medicines by the pharmacist.
Brief History and Development
A classic example of negligence by a pharmacist was stated in
Thomas v. Winchester,4 where a dangerous drug was sold clearly labeled
as a harmless one. The landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.5 extended liability beyond that of the immediate user where a dan-
* B.S. in Pharmacy, Univ. of Toledo; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State Univ.
1 2 Frumer-Friedman, Products Liability 479 (1968); privity requirements; rejecting
privity is discussed in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966).
The Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-318 removes privity as to members of the
purchaser's family, his household and guests if it is reasonable to assume such person
may use or consume such product. Some states have deleted the section as too re-
strictive: e.g., California. Other jurisdictions have abolished privity in regard to food,
cosmetics and drug products.
2 Lack of a sale has been held a proper defense to a warranty action. Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 123 N.E. 2d 792 (1954); held blood transfusion
as incidental to service. Similar cases are Goelz v. Wadley Research Center, 350
S.W. 2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood
Bank, Inc., 132 N.W. 2d 805 (Minn. 1965). Contra: article discussing those cases hold-
ing a contra view is discussed in 24 Business Lawyer 847 (April 1969).
3 Greenman v. Yuba Powers Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P. 2d 897 (1963);
purchaser hit by power tool while operating it. Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill.
App. 2d 70, 215 N.E. 2d 465 (1966); defect in design, however, rather than in manu-
facture, caused the injury. Schonfeld v. Norton, 391 F. 2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968); no
privity required if foreseeable harm from defective product marketed.
4 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
5 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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gerous article was involved. Rylands v. Fletcher
6 had set the early stand-
ards of liability without fault.
As a result of the difficulties encountered in successfully sustaining
a suit based upon negligence, the warranty doctrine 
began to be fre-
quently employed as a basis for liability. While negligence 
is a concept
based upon fault, warranty arises where there is injury as a result of
a failure of a product to measure up to the express or 
implied warranties
of the manufacturer or seller. No negligence need be proved.
7 Breach
of warranty, as a result, is the preferred method of pleading
-s Ordinarily
in a breach of warranty the buyer must prove the existence 
of the war-
ranty,9 breach of the warranty,
10 loss or injury resulting from the breach,
and that the breach was the proximate cause of the 
loss." While under
the Uniform Sales Act reliance was deemed necessary 
for a warranty
action, the U.C.C. no longer considers it essential 12 except 
for the war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose."
What does the U.C.C. do about the field of product liability? 
Three
things are apparent: (1) it gives statutory definitions to the terms express
and implied warranties, (2) it defines the scope of such warranties, 
and
(3) it has substantial impact upon the efficacy and scope of the 
dis-
claimer itself.
4
Justice Jackson prophetically described in 1953 the present 
apparent
philosophy concerning product liability. He said,
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever increasing 
extent
our population is dependent upon mass producers for 
its food and
drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. 
There no
longer are natural or simple products but complex ones 
whose com-
positions and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent 
society
must exact greater care than in more simple days and 
must require
from the manufacturer or producers increased integrities 
and cau-
tion as the only protection of its safety and well being. 
Purchasers
cannot try our drugs to determine whether they kill 
or cure. Con-
sumers cannot test the youngster's cowboy suit or the 
manufacturer's
sweaters to see if they are apt to burst into fatal flames. 
Carriers
by land or by sea cannot experiment with the combustibility 
of
6 L.R. 1 Exch. 265 (1868).
7 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 
2d 69 (1960); Bailey v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 431 P. 2d 108 (Ariz. 1967).
8 Hursh, American Law of Product Liability, sec. 
3:1 (1961).
9 Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-314, Comment 
B.
1o Kepling v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 378 F. 2d 5 (6th Cir. 1967); 
Jacobson v. Ford Motor
Co., 427 P. 2d 621 (Kan. 1967).
11 Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F. 2d 751 (7th Cir. 1966).
12 Ingalls v. Meissner, 11 Wis. 2d 371, 105 N.W. 2d 748 (1960); however, now only bare
proof of reliance is needed. Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat 
Co., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 474
P. 2d 549 (1962).
13 Uniform Commercial Code, secs. 2-315, 2-316.
14 Disclaimer of Warranty & Products Liability, 1 UCC Law J. 178 (1968).
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goods in transit. Where experiment or research is necessary to de-
termine the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not
be tried out on the public, nor must the public be expected to pos-
sess the facilities or technical knowledge to learn for itself of inher-
ent but latent dangers. The claim that a hazard was not foreseen
is not available to one who did not use foresight appropriate to his
enterprise.' 5
The Pharmacist
The importance of the pharmacist as a member of the health team
is well recognized, even though attempts have been made to license those
unqualified. 16 Since the pharmacist does have an unique position in the
community, what is usually referred to as reasonable care under the
circumstances is actually the highest degree of care.' 7 The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved. An example, while in
the field of medicine and not pharmacy, is the tendency to abolish the
"locality" rule which once existed in determining due care. The urban
or rural rule which once prevailed no longer exists.1 8 The pharmacist,
no matter where he practices, must keep abreast of the latest medical
as well as legal developments that affect him.
Express Warranties
Ordinarily an express warranty might not present a burdensome
problem except that the U.C.C. tends to increase the possibility of an
express warranty rather than limit it and creates a reliance by the com-
munity on the pharmacist as an expert in the field of drugs.19 By defi-
nition the Code states:
Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmations or promise.20
Usually when dealing with the retailer it is difficult to determine
whether the language used constituted an express warranty or was mere
15 Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15, 51-52 (dissent) (cert., 5th Cir. 1953).
16 An example of this is discussed in Maine Pharmacy Ass'n v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 245 A. 2d 271 (Me. 1968); State Board of Pharmacy enjoined from permit-
ting unqualified applicants to take examination. National Ass'n of Retail Druggists,
Jan. 1969, Subprofessionals Cannot Do the Job.
17 Krueger v. Knutson, 261 Minn. 144, 111 N.W. 2d 526 (1961); potassium chlorate
sold by druggist without appropriate warnings.
18 Avey v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 442 P. 2d 1013 (Kan. 1968);
implies that due to the standard licensing by the State by way of statutes and regu-
lations, and the availability of literature, mass communications etc., a geographic
area should not.impede one's knowledge per se.
19 Infra note 59.
20 Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-313(1) (a); for discussion see Collins, Warranty
of Sale Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 Ia. L. Rev. 63 (1956).
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opinion. The Code further states that while no specific language or intent
is needed,
any affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warrant. 21
There is little case law regarding a pharmacist's express warranty
of patent medicine. The reason for this is that pharmacists seldom utter
definite statements concerning a product, other than their opinion. How-
ever, in the field of health, and with the adoption of the U.C.C., it is
increasingly important for the pharmacist to be careful of what he says
while making a sale. A loose tongue may unintentionally create liability.
Whenever the only evidence to an express warranty is wholly or
partly oral, the creation of a warranty has been held to be a jury ques-
tion.22 However, statements as to the safety and suitability, if stated as
more than mere opinion and untrue can be actionable.23 The trend has
been to construe the statements of the seller as warranties if reason-
able.24 The affirmations by the seller may be such that there arises both
an express warranty as well as a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.
Statements like "good" or "used by others" have consistently been
held to be mere opinion or sales talk. Where the clerk told a customer
that while she did not stock the dress requested, but she did have one
similar and even better, it was held to be puffing. 25 A salesgirl's state-
ment that the product (artificial fingernail kit) was "wonderful" was
held to be seller's talk.26 A contrary view was held in Brown v. Shel-
ton,27 where a statement about a hair dye, that she had no complaints
and everyone liked it, was held to be an express warranty. This seems
to be the minority view. In Bel v. Adler 2 the court stated, "to charge
a dealer with an express warranty of the goods the circumstances must
be sufficient to show not only the buyer relied upon the dealer's state-
ment as being an express warranty, but that the dealer intended them
as such and knew that the buyer was so relying or would be justified
21 Id. (2).
22 Compton v. M. O'Neil, 101 Ohio App. 378, 139 N.E. 2d 635 (1955); 46 Am. Jur. 502
(1943); 77 C.J.S. 1306 (1952).
23 Jeffery v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239 P. 2d 346 (1952); even with good inten-
tions and belief of truthfulness if statement is false, liability may arise.
24 CCH, sec. 1080, Products Liability Rptr.
25 Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braunt Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A. 2d 650 (1939).
26 Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E. 2d 635 (1958).
27 391 P. 2d 259 (Okla. 1964); a strong dissent was made by Vice Chief Justice Hully,
stating that no warranty existed.
28 63 Ga. App. 473, 11 S.E. 2d 495 (1940); Wood v. Hub Motor Co., 110 Ga. App. 101,
137 S.E. 2d 674 (1964); the only warranty by the retailer is that the goods were pur-
chased from a reputable manufacturer.
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in so doing." Under the Code, however, it seems the requirements may
be substantially less.
In the absence of bad faith, the recommendation of a reputable
manufacturer's product in general or broad language is nothing more
than an opinion even if it concerns a legend29 drug.s0 If the pharmacist
adopts the warranties on the label as his own or sells it under his own
label,3 1 he will be held liable for injuries caused by the drug having
injurious components. 32 When the pharmacist sells a patent medicine
and is reading the information from the label of the product, he should
make known to the customer that it is the manufacturer's advice and not
his own.
The labeling requirements on patent medicines must meet stringent
Federal33 and State 3 1 regulations. The label contains particular infor-
mation needed by the consumer to safely use the product3 5 as a means
of self-treatment. It is apparent that some confusion might arise between
the general statements made by the pharmacist and the particular indi-
cations on the label. In the absence of negligence or of any express war-
ranty (assuming the language used is mere opinion) it would appear that
the customer is relying on the labeling rather than the pharmacist's talk.
This is, of course, important when showing a warranty for a particular
use which is implied by law. This nevertheless creates a difficult situ-
ation. The Code states that the intention of the parties is of primary
concern.
6
The buyer may contribute to or cause his own injury by using the
product under conditions specifically warned against.37 Sometimes this
can present an easy defense.38 However, in warranty, contributory negli-
gence may not be a proper defense and some jurisdictions will not in-
quire into those actions.3 9
29 A definition of legend is given in Lawyers' Medical Encyclopedia, sec. 3A.4 (curr.
Rev. ed.); potent and dangerous if not taken under the direction of a physician.
30 Ray v. Burbank & Jones, 61 Ga. 506, 34 Am. Rep. 103 (1878).
31 Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931).
32 Willson v. Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 208 N.Y. 108, 101 N.E. 799 (1913).
33 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A., sec. 352.
34 Patent medicines are subject to regulation under the police powers, of the state
to protect the public health. Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 73 L. Ed. 204 (1928);
State Board of Pharmacy v. Matthews, 197 N.Y.S. 353, 90 N.E. 966 (1910).
85 Id. supra note 34(f) (1).
86 Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-316.
37 Fredendall v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 279 N.Y.S. 146, 18 N.E. 2d 11 (1938).
88 Ibid.
39 Young v. Aeroil Products Co., 248 F. 2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957).
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Implied Warranty of Merchantability
This part of warranty under the Code appears less complex. Gen-
erally, the U.C.C. permits the warranty of merchantability to arise in
any sale by a merchant. It has been defined as meaning that the thing
sold is reasonably fit for the general purpose for which it is manufactured
and sold.40 The Code sets up six standards for merchantability; 41 among
them; that the goods must be such as conform to the promise of affirma-
tions of fact on the container or label. 42 It is imposed by law to promote
higher standards by the manufacturer and retailer, and to protect the
public as a matter of public policy. The retailer is in a better position
to determine and select the products he will sell, and the consumer relies
on his selection.43 Even for latent defects the retailer may be held liable,
since, under warranty, no proof of negligence or notice or knowledge of
the defect is required.44 Under the doctrine of public policy, protection
for the consumer seems of prime importance. While the consumer might
have an action against the manufacturer, it is easier to bring suit against
the retailer with whom he deals directly. In modern practice however,
suit is initiated against all persons who might be responsible for the
injury, and the retailer can join the manufacturer responsible for the
injury, as. a party.45
It is quite clear that if the retailer purchases his goods from a
reputable manufacturer or dealer, he is under no duty to inspect or
analyze each package. 46 If an injury results from such a sale, the re-
tailer is not guilty of negligence.47 He is under a duty to exercise reason-
able care to prevent injury due to a known danger. But in Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc.,48 where a loaf of bread was sold con-
taining a pin inside it, the court stated that one of the hazards of being
in the retail business was that the seller must hold out merchandise as
being reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is required, or that the
article is of merchantable quality or both. The retailer here was allowed
to recoup his losses from the manufacturer.
A main difficulty in this area is the adverse reaction or allergy re-
sponse. This is usually the responsibility of the manufacturer or one
40 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 7; Davidson v. Wee, 93 Ariz.
191, 379 P. 2d 744 (1963).
41 Uniform Commercial Code, sec. 2-314 (2).
42 Id. (f).
43 Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 170 A. 2d 160 (Me. 1961).
44 1 Williston 617 (curr. Rev. ed.) (Personal Property Law) sec. 96, subd. 3.
45 Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E. 2d 822 (1951).
46 West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 188, 47 A. 965 (1901).
47 Ibid., Howard v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 55 Ga. App. 163, 189 S.E. 373 (1937).
48 255 N.Y.S. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
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who holds himself out as such.49 This should pose no problem to the
pharmacist unless he should by express warranty or by warranty for
a particular purpose acquire greater liability for himself. He would be
guaranteeing the results, for such liability to attach. This is certainly
true under the former Uniform Sales Act. The Code may be different,
however, as pertaining to the warranty for a particular purpose.
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
A warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises by operation
of law whenever a buyer can establish that he has relied upon the judg-
ment or skill of the seller who has reason to know the particular purpose
for which the product is sold. "° However, if examination by the buyer
should have disclosed the defect, there is no liability. Under the Uniform
Sales Act,51 as well as the Code, ordinarily no warranty for a particular
purpose arises when the product is sold by its brand name. 52 However,
under the Code the fact that an item is purchased by its trade name does
not eliminate such a warranty if selected 53 or recommended 54 by the
seller. While some cases hold contra, 55 the majority maintain that the
retailer may still be liable under the warranty for a particular purpose
while selling a trade name product. 56
It has been held that often the two implied warranties coincide ,5
especially concerning food products. The difficulty for the retailer is
that such a theory extends liability to him. The writer fails to under-
stand such a rationale in certain circumstances. Let us examine the
pharmacist and see how it relates to his duties in selling patent medi-
cines.
49 Tiedje v. Haney, supra note 31.
50 Uniform Commercial Code, supra note 13.
51 Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15(4) states that in the case of a contract to sell or a sale
of a specified article under its patent or trade name there is no implied warranty as
to fitness for any particular purpose.
52 Ibid.; Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth & Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E. 2d 427 (1941); mas-
cara purchased by trade name.
53 Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A. 2d 911 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951); hearing aid selected
by the seller.
54 Ireland v. Liggett & Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N.E. 371 (1922); cold cream recom-
mended by clerk; Haney v. Radio Corp. of America, 390 P. 2d 980 (Wash. 1964); TV
set purchased; Handy v. Holland Furnace Co., 11 Wis. 2d 151, 105 N.W. 2d 299 (1960);
thermostat recommended by the seller.
55 William v. S. H. Kress. & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P. 2d 662 (1955); Howe SearleCo. v. Furst, 23 Cambria 84 (Cambria County Ct. of Pa., 1960); held under the Uni-form Commercial Code where an experienced buyer did not rely on seller, especially
since there was no sales talk.
56 Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A. 2d 666 (1947); lipstick as
sold; Brown v. Shelton, supra note 27; Howard v. Avon Products, 395 P. 2d 1007(Colo. 1964).
57 Ibid,
Sept. 1969
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The drugstore itself is devoted to selling literally thousands of dif-
ferent items. The pharmacist generally acts as manager for such opera-
tions. He is qualified professionally,5" however, by education and train-
ing, to compound and fill prescriptions" from a licensed physician. The
practice of pharmacy comprehends the compounding and preparing of
drugs that are usually dangerous when handled by those not qualified
in the properties of drugs. As well qualified as he may be in the field
of drugs, he nevertheless cannot practice medicine.60 He does not possess
the skill or judgment to diagnose a particular illness. The main function
of the pharmacist then is not to act as an intermediary for the doctor for
less serious diseases (although in practice many people may feel this is
so).
As a result when a person asks for something good for a cough and
is given something that is reasonably fit for such a purpose, it would
appear that the pharmacist is warranting nothing other than merchant-
ability. A breach under these circumstances would indicate an action
in negligence 6 1 primarily. It is important to distinguish what action may
arise since the defenses available will be limited in warranty cases. To
imply that a request for a cough syrup gives rise to a warranty for a
particular purpose is not altogether conclusive. As a matter of fact, it
appears to be nothing more than a general purpose. The distinction may
seem slight but the liability that arises under each can be substantial.
The Code specifically states that to qualify under the particular pur-
pose warranty it cannot be a general request.6 2 While under the Uni-
form Sales Act a hypersensitive reaction was a good defense to any war-
ranty action, the Code does not mention this qualification. Under the
warranty of merchantability, this would be the manufacturer's respon-
sibility. However, under the warranty for a particular purpose, it is pos-
sible for a pharmacist to sell a product free from any defect (thereby
eliminating any liability on the manufacturer), reasonably fit for the
general purpose required, and still be liable for some injury resulting
from such product due to an allergic response. This is true even in the
absence of any negligence.
58 28 C.J.S. 57 (1941).
59 An example of the skill required for the practice of pharmacy in Ohio can be
found in Ohio Rev. Code sec. 4729.08 (1953). It requires graduation from a recognized
college of pharmacy, internship for a period of one year under the supervision of a
registered pharmacist, and passing an examination by the State Board to obtain a
certificate.
60 Underwood v. Scott, 43 Kan. 714, 23 P. 942, 943 (1890); the practice of medicine
may be said to consist of three things: first, in judging the nature, character and
symptoms of the disease; second, in determining the proper remedy for the disease;
and third, in giving or prescribing the application of the remedy to the disease.
61 Thomas v. Winchester, supra note 4.
62 Regula v. Gerber, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 196, 70 NE. 2d 662 (1946); distinguished par-
ticular and general purpose. This is distinguishable, however, in Kurriss v. Conrad,
312 Mass. 670, 46 N.E. 2d 12 (1942); selection from a merchant's general stock may
still imply a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
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There seems to be quite a difference in requesting an item such as
a thermostat 63 to function properly in a furnace and in asking for some
patent medicine for a cough or cold. The former can easily be ascer-
tained by precise measurements, while the latter could not be ascertained
to any great degree even by a qualified physician. This appears to the
writer to be one distinction between a general and particular purpose.
The buyer must in fact rely upon the seller's superior skill or judg-
ment.6 4 It is at least questionable whether one can rely upon facts which
do not exist when considering the warranty for a particular purpose.
The fact that the consumer thinks that the pharmacist can suggest some
patent medicine for a particular illness because of his training should not
create greater liability for the pharmacist. A secret reliance, I suppose,
would include a mistaken reliance, and this is insufficient to give rise to
a warranty for a particular purpose.65 Usually in interpreting a code
a rather narrow construction is given. That is one of the purposes of
a code.
The definition of patent medicine"6 itself indicates that the public
can treat themselves if they so desire. The druggist has no duty to speak
at all when he sells a requested trade name product unless the circum-
stances would indicate otherwise. This would be true in the sale of
poisons, where, by state law, the seller must inquire into the use or pur-
pose of acquisition and so designate it in the appropriate book of record.
It would also seem prudent in the sale of dangerous items to minors or
aged people where the likelihood of misuse would be greater. His duty
increases, however, when he recommends a product, since the purchaser
may very well be considered to be relying upon the judgment and skill
of the seller.
The pharmacist can state that a certain patent medicine is good for
a particular purpose, and may thereby become an insurer,67 a very fool-
ish thing to do. The labeling requirements 8 should be taken into con-
sideration in determining whether reliance is actually upon the pharma-
cist in making the sale. 69 Fuhs v. Barber70 states that no liability arises
to a druggist for lack of instructions as to the safe method of handling
63 Handy v. Holland Furnace Co., supra note 54.
64 Frumer-Friedman, supra note 1, sec. 19.03(4) (b).
65 McCormick v. Hoyt, 53 Wash. 2d 338, 333 P. 2d 639 (1959); a secret reliance does
not meet the requirements of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
66 The term used in this article indicates that the product can be purchased without
a physician's prescription. and is similar to over-the-counter products that may be
bought at retail stores. Specifically it indicates that the manufacturer has the exclu-
sive right to manufacture and sale of an invention or patented item.
67 Otherwise the druggist is not an insurer; Traynor, The Ways & Means of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965).
68 Supra note 33, 34; Albert Food Products v. U.S., 194 F. 2d 463 (9th Cir. 1952).
69 McCormick v. Hoyt, supra note 65.
70 140 Kan. 373, 36 P. 2d 962 (1934).
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articles called for by the customer, where the dangerous qualities are
generally known and nothing would indicate to the seller that the buyer
could not be entrusted with such a product. Cullinan v. Tetrault71 stated
that no liability resulted when a customer relied upon a seventeen year
old boy, obviously inexperienced, to get a certain patent medicine, and
was given the wrong one clearly labeled as to its true content. Section
2-317 of the U.C.C. states that adequate warning through product label-
ing and instructions accompanying the sale discharges the manufacturer's
duty. The pharmacist should draw attention to those instructions in
every sale.
72
While the complexities of chemicals are great, the consumer should
be aware of the dangers and be required to read labels, especially in an
age of universal education. This is important nowadays, since in our
earlier history one would assume that the population could not under-
stand the dangers involved. That is certainly not true today, even though
some choose to ignore it. A pharmacist is not necessarily liable for an
error cf judgment consistent with ordinary care and skill.73 Where the
danger is evident, as a matter of common knowledge, no liability arises
for the retailer.7 4 However, it has also been held that even though a
person may be guilty of contributory negligence, if, by reason of his age
or lack of information or experience, he does not understand the risk
involved, he will not be deemed to assume the risk.75 It would appear
to be quite an extension of law to hold the pharmacist liable under the
warranty for a particular purpose in some of these circumstances, and
yet that possibility seems feasible.
Conclusion
Public policy should not forget the retailer. The risk of proprietor-
ship, while great, is not endless. Should a pharmacist carry a sign or
play a tape recorder disclaiming any implied warranties every time he
makes a sale of a patent medicine? The law seems to be approaching
this conclusion.
To complicate matters, there is pending legislation to introduce a re-
classification of drugs76 that would permit a pharmacist to sell certain
71 123 Me. 302, 122 A. 770 (1923); court relied on the purchaser buying from a boy
rather than from not reading the label.
72 Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceutical, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1948); failure to
give adequate warnings during the sale of a suppository.
73 Jones v. Walgreen, 265 Ill. App. 308 (1932), Tremblay v. Kimball, 107 Me. 53, 77 A.
405 (1910).
74 Wilkinson v. Rich's Inc., 77 Ga. App. 239, 48 S.E. 2d 552 (1948).
75 Frumer-Friedman supra note 1, sec. 16A(5) (f).
76 American Druggist, Jan. 13, 1969; What to Watch for in Congress; discusses the
chances and hopes of a reclassification of drugs.
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drugs formerly requiring a physician's prescription. Reliance in these
sales would be evident. The question that immediately arises here is
whether it is governed by the Code as a sale, or might it be only inci-
dental to a service?
There is one direction that seems to take all these factors into con-
sideration. Instead of a strict liability doctrine,7 7 one resembling com-
parative negligence seems prudent. The U.C.C. Law Journal 78 describes
such a theory as comparative fault. The "do or die" doctrine 79 and the
"all or nothing" philosophy certainly seem barbaric in an age of increas-
ing education and intelligence. Certainly no one system is perfect or
inclusive, but when comparing their relative merits, the strict liability-
without-fault doctrine is not appealing (especially to the retailer). The
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher"° can be extended too far. A Texas
court said, "What pressing reasons clamor for adoption of the rule of
liability without fault, and the abandonment of the rule of negligence?
In our opinion, there is no need for the rule of liability without fault.
In fact, there was no such need even in the case of Rylands v.
Fletcher." 81
77 Restatement of Torts 2d, sec. 402A (1965).
78 Note, Comparative Fault in Warranty, 1 U.C.C. Law Journal 59 (1968).
79 Ibid.
80 Supra note 6.
81 Klosterman v. Houston Geographysical Co., 315 S.W. 2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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